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ABSTRACT
This article analyses the so-called key drivers of development in post-colonial 
Africa in the contexts of African leaders’ conceptualisation thereof. It exposes the 
divergent concepts of development that have appeared to uniformly retard Africa’s 
progress. The article acknowledges the myriad of institutional factors such as lead-
ership, corruption and neo-patrimonialism that have contributed to post-colonial 
Africa’s development challenges. In pursued of its argument, the article’s approach 
is explorative and descriptive, thereby justifying the adoption of qualitative lit-
erature assessment methodology. Theoretically, the article holds a Pan-Africanist 
worldview wherefrom Africanism is central to all development. It is worth noting 
that not much scholarship has been done within the fields of Public Administration 
and Management on how modernisation as a theory has created a scope for elite 
accumulation in post-colonial states on the African continent. This article is an at-
tempt to close the gap in scholarly discourse with regard to Africa’s development 
trajectories. Due to the multiplicity and complexities of Africa itself, there can 
be no universal monolithic description of Africanism; hence, the article recom-
mends that post-colonial Africa’s development process should, starting with the 
determination of philosophical orientation, planning and policy decisions, embrace 
public participation.
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INTRODUCTION
Development is a complex concept and its practice has been elusive, especially for 
Africa. Being subjective, development means different things to different people. The 
World Bank (1997) refers to development as a qualitative improvement of the lives 
of the people, which includes quality education, better health services, alleviation of 
poverty, equal social and economic opportunities for all races, respect for cultural 
practices, maximum individual freedom and a clean environment. Willis (2010) fol-
lows the same line of thinking arguing that development should be measured by 
an improvement of quality health, education and reasonable standard of living, 
among others. This appearance of simplicity of development entails a complex and 
elusive reality.
This complexity derives from the divergent and, sometimes, contradictory concep-
tions of development. Proponents of development as a process of structural change 
conceive it as “historical change” (Thomas 2000, 2004). The view of “structural 
transformation” and “long-term transformation of economies and societies” and 
long-term as Gore (2000:794–795) observes, has been pre-dominated in the 1950s 
and 1960s. The key features of this perspective are that it is focused on the process 
of structural societal change as well as historical aspects and long-term outlook. This 
perspective implies a major societal shift in one dimension, for example from a rural-
based society to an urban or industrially-based society. Sometimes, this perspective 
is stretched to embrace a problematic interpretation as a as shift from “traditional” to 
“modern” society with radical implications in dimensions such as societal structural 
changes in terms of class within relations of production. This understanding of de-
velopment emphasises change in the relationship between the owners of capital and 
labour (Deane 1965), which tacitly suggests that capitalism is accepted as a form of 
societal development.
Theoretically, the article holds a Pan-Africanist worldview wherefrom Africanism is 
central to all development. It is worth noting that not much scholarship has been done 
within the fields of Public Administration and Management on how modernisation as a 
theory has created a scope for elite accumulation in post-colonial states on the African 
continent. This article is an attempt to close the gap in scholarly discourse with regard 
to Africa’s development trajectories. Due to the multiplicity and complexities of Africa 
itself, there can be no universal monolithic description of Africanism; hence, the article 
recommends that post-colonial Africa’s development process should, starting with the 
determination of philosophical orientation, planning and policy decisions, embrace 
public participation.
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SLIPPERY CONCEPTS OF DEVELOPMENT
Development relates to a wide view of domestic changes, which does not relate to any 
particular set of objectives and is not necessarily prescriptive. Equally, there is no expecta-
tion that all societies would follow a predetermined development process. Countries for 
example do change overtime and, generally, experience economic growth and societal 
change. However, development is itself a contradictory process that may involve crises 
in the course of progress. Despite its generally non-prescriptive nature, this perspective 
has a strong resonance with the “meta-narratives” (meaning overriding theories of societal 
change) that dominated development studies) during the Cold War. These were the grand 
visions of societal transformation–either desirable transformation as modernisation, or 
desirable as a process of emancipation from underdevelopment. These are the different 
perspectives which, generally, attempted to prescribe their own common pathway to an 
industrialised society. These meta-narratives of development as structural societal change 
were deemed to be unsatisfactory in explanatory power in the late 1980s. According to 
Hickey & Moham (2003), the failure of this approach to development has been associ-
ated with reasons for a shift from conceptions of development as structural change.
Another perspective portrayed development as “a vision or measure of progressive 
change” (Gore 2000:791). This view is narrower in definition and technocratic or in-
strumental as some would argue. At its basic level the view is simply concerned with 
development as occurring in terms of a set of short- to medium-term “performance 
indicators” – goals or outcomes – which can be measured and compared with targets. 
It is therefore the best instrumental element which is favoured by practitioners within 
the development community notably is likely to be favoured by practitioners within the 
development community. The key feature of this second perspective is that it is focused 
on the outcomes of change so that it has a relatively short-term outlook and “ahistorical” 
(Gore 2000). This view is however problematic to others because it presupposes a set of 
(essentially bureaucratic or government) goals or objectives which may not be shared by 
many of the people who are supposedly benefitting from development. The thinking is 
that paternalistic assumption of what is good for people’s well-being based on universal 
values and characteristics. This also raises a question of ‘ownership’ not so much in the 
context of the government but more in the context of the people, the poor in particular. 
According to Gore (2004), there is a concern that this short-term and instrumental view 
of development loses the (grand) vision of societal transformation and separates the con-
ception of development from socio-economic structures, social relations and politics.
Furthermore, conceptions of development took a radical perspective which suggested 
that development consisted of “bad” outcomes resulting from the imposition of Western 
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ethnocentric notions and practice on Third World societies. This is the “post-term” 
conceptualisation of development (it can also be referred to as the “post-development”, 
“post-colonial” or “post-structuralist” position). This conception emerged as a reaction 
to the deliberate efforts at progress made in the name of development since World War 
II and was triggered in particular by the 1949 Declaration by the United States (US) 
President Truman that: “... we must embark on a bold new program for making the ben-
efits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and 
growth of under-development areas” (cited in Esteva 1992:6).
There has been a debate within the field of development about the dominance of a par-
ticular ideology, the exclusion of certain groups (for example, gender, ethnicity, religion 
or class) and the processes and procedures of development (for example, top-down, 
bottom-up and participative). Some of these have been presented as development alter-
natives and have played a significant role in drawing attention to some of the problems 
of development. John Brohman’s book entitled Popular Development: Rethinking the 
Theory and Practice of Development, is divided into two parts: the first deals with main-
streams theories and practices, and the second with alternative theories and practices, 
leading to a new framework that he calls “popular development.” He has however been 
criticised for making a clear distinction between the mainstream and alternatives even 
though it is evident that the adoption of alternative approaches by the mainstream has 
led to a blurring of the boundaries between them. Development alternatives have not 
remained alternative for long – many of them have been successfully and often quite 
rapidly absorbed into the mainstream. The alternatives are presented as popular and 
people-centred, including approaches such as gender and development.
Against this background, this article examines what have been the key drivers of devel-
opment in Africa’s post-colonialism and how African leaders have conceptualised the 
concept of development. For African leaders, development means modernisation which 
is nothing else but Europeanisation or Americanisation of Africa. The objective of de-
velopment therefore is to catch up with European capitalism and lifestyle. Europeanism 
then became a prototype or model of development. This exploratory article is embed-
ded within the anti-positivist ontological perspective, using a qualitative descriptive ap-
proach and a subjective epistemological standpoint. That is, analyses in the article are 
informed by value judgments rather than objectivism. To this extent, the article examines 
conceptions of Africanism in development.
Pan-Africanism represents the complexities of African political, economic and intel-
lectual thought over two hundred years. Hence, the theoretical framework of Pan-
Africanism is relevant in this article when examining the complexities of development 
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on the African continent. At a basic level, it is a belief that African peoples, both on 
the African continent and in the Diaspora, share not merely a common history, but a 
common destiny. This sense of interconnected pasts and futures has taken many forms, 
especially in the creation of political institutions. It is very interesting to note that Pan-
African consciousness was born beyond the shores of Africa, pioneered by the African 
Diaspora (Breakfast & Mekoa 2016).
According to Abdul-Raheem (1996), the concept of Pan-Africanism first entered the po-
litical lexicon in the early 1900s when Henry Sylvester Williams, then based in London 
called a conference of African descent to protest stealing of land and racial discrimina-
tion, among other things. It was, however, in 1919 when African-American scholar and 
political activist, WEB Du Bois, convened what he called the first Pan African Congress 
in Paris, which was followed by a series of Pan African congresses (Breakfast & Mekoa 
2016). While the period 1900–1919 can be cited confidently as an important reference 
point for the Pan African movement, other scholars will argue that the roots of the 
movement stretch beyond to that period during the slavery of Africans by Europeans 
five hundred years before. Hence, the founders of Pan Africanist movement have been 
Africans from the Diaspora who were the descendants of the Africans captured in the 
transatlantic slave trade (Abdul-Raheem 1996).
Afrocentric studies developed out of the desire to reconstruct the African consciousness. 
As Asante (1988:9) writes, “we have one African cultural system manifested in diversi-
ties”. Asante further states that “we respond to the same rhythms of the universe, the same 
cosmological sensibilities, the same general historical reality”. The goal is not necessarily 
about recreation of the African values and genius in the context of postcolonial world. 
Afrocentricity also does not use pigmentology as its defining element. As a discipline it 
operates from a unique perspective on a coherent culture (Asante 1990). By culture is 
meant “shared perceptions, attitudes, and predispositions that allow people to organize 
experiences in certain ways” (Asante 1990:9). It is not “simply the study of black people 
but the study of African people from an Afrocentric perspective” (Asante 1987:163). 
Asante explains: “the Afrocentricist seeks to recover and use codes, paradigms, symbols, 
motifs, myths, and circles of discussion that reinforce the centrality of African ideals and 
values as a valid frame of reference for acquiring and examining data” (Asante 1990:6). 
The conditions of the African people on the continent are rooted in three main prob-
lems: different expectations from independence by the political and bureaucratic African 
Leadership on the one hand, and on the other hand the popular masses; wrong con-
cepts of development; and, the design of the imperial or neo-colonial powers on Africa 
(Machyo 1996:35). The problems of independent Africa have been a combination of the 
legacy of colonial rule and problems imposed by the international economic bodies like 
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the IMF and World Bank. This international economic order has also been very hostile to 
Africa particularly after gaining its independence. Thus, when African leaders gained po-
litical control the economic order was controlled by the international institutions. They 
had to preserve the political independence of their national state, preserve their national 
integrity and promote peace and well-being for their people but at the same time adhere 
to the dictates of their hostile international economic institutions. Thus genuinely speak-
ing, Africa has never been ruled by single leadership but internally by African leadership 
which exercise political control, and externally by international economic institutions 
which executed economic power (Breakfast & Mekoa 2016).
The economic power has in most cases been more powerful than political power and 
even dictates political direction. It is against this background that contemporary Pan-
African and political representations should be understood. Not as essentially a nega-
tion, but profoundly affirmation, of indigenous African knowledge systems through 
reversal of both epistemicide and linguacide. Hence the need for a research that speaks 
to and engages African authenticity: one that is not just combative but more importantly 
liberatory. Admittedly, and with all its imposed obstacles, the post-colonial era provides 
a poignant strategic opportunity to reverse epistemicide and linguacide, and duly reclaim 
indigenous African knowledge systems. The following section discusses critically the 
modernisation theory and its application to the African continent.
Modernisation Theory
Modernisation theory, one of the early approaches to development, is normally associ-
ated with Arthur Lewis and Walter Rostow and came into prominence during the early 
1960s. However, it must be noted that modernisation was not a unitary theory. It was 
a process and not just an economic event. Both these development economists held 
a firm view that economic growth should be at the center of development in society 
(Breakfast 2013). They were of the view that the labour market in the traditional sector 
of the economy should be modernised in order to attract investment, and that economic 
growth would subsequently be expected to follow. Proponents of modernisation argue 
very strongly that Third World countries should follow the same development path as 
that followed by First World countries (Rostow 1960; Graat & Venter 2004).
Supporters of modernisation embrace the Darwinian theory of evolution in society. 
This implies that society is not stagnating but that it is dynamic and should evolve as 
time goes on. This reinforces the argument that culture should be subjected to change. 
In the discourse on modernisation there is an emphasis on new technology and science 
in the modern world (to promote development). Scholars of the modernisation school 
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tend to blame political leaders in developing countries for misleading their people by 
implementing centrally planned economies such as socialism as opposed to market 
oriented economies (Rostow 1960; Coetzee 2004; Martinussen 2004). According to 
these scholars, the reliance on the state does not accelerate development but rather 
hinders the process from occurring, because they hold the view that socialism does 
not attract foreign direct investment. Advocates of political modernisation blame 
the internal dynamics in developing countries for a lack of development. Central to 
this diagnosis is corruption in developing countries, especially in Africa. Corruption 
is singled out among other things as one of the main causes of underdevelopment 
(Warren 1980).
Developing countries, according to this school of thought, should embrace Western 
standards of government such as bureaucracy, multiparty democracy, liberal democracy 
and a vibrant civil society. According to the political theory of modernisation, liberal 
democracy is the only path to development, because it protects the right to own private 
property or business. Moreover, liberal democracy is perceived to be promoting free 
enterprise which is supportive of capital and its maximisation of profit (Harrison 1995; 
Chazan et al. 1999; Marshall & Scott, 2005). Fukuyama (1992) asserts that liberal de-
mocracy is the only political system that can unify different people globally. Fukuyama 
(1992) further states that liberal democracy alongside the free market system principles 
has succeeded in promoting economic development in First World countries including 
some aspects of the impoverished developing countries.
However, both neo-liberalism and modernisation have been criticized by a number of 
scholars for emphasizing the dominance of the market while not changing the lives of 
poor people for the better on the African continent. According to Fine (1998, 2010), a 
proclamation made in 1998 by Joseph Stiglitz, a former senior vice-president, and senior 
economist at the World Bank, stated that the “Washington Consensus” had failed; and, 
that a “post-Washington Consensus” was needed and should encourage both the state 
and market forces to work together for economic development. Modernisation theory 
implied that African/developing countries were expected to follow the economic ap-
proaches embraced by Western countries. Nonetheless, European countries, through 
multi-lateral institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund were 
misleading developing countries by telling them to open up their markets. While they 
themselves protected their own local markets, in trade relations, European governments 
are subsidising their own local farmers. These bilateral and multilateral trade agreements 
between the South and North are essentially unequal. This leads one to question the 
objective of modernisation theory in relation to development in Third World countries 
(Breakfast, 2013).
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Dependency Theory and/or Approach
Dependency theory is a neo-Marxist-inspired theoretical framework. Frank (1980) 
blames the First World countries for lack of development in less developed countries. 
Frank (1980) goes on to say that developed countries are misleading developing coun-
tries by advising them to adopt capitalist economic policies that do not provide em-
ployment opportunities. He concludes that “in their view, unemployment has graduated 
from being merely normal to being natural as well, for business and certain politicians; 
unemployment has become not only natural but downright desirable. This being so, 
economists have had to catch up with the times” (Frank 1980:73). Proponents of the 
dependency school blame international forces such as multinational corporations for 
exploiting the resources of the developing countries. They hold colonialism and post-
colonial relations between First World countries responsible for the lack of development. 
These multilateral relationships are based on exploitation of the natural resources of the 
developing countries. The root cause of underdevelopment in Third War countries is 
located in “imperialist expansion” (Baran 1957; Frank 1969; Chazan et al. 1999; Graat & 
Venter 2004; Martinussen 2004).
Wa Thiong’o (2005:20) argues that the international bourgeoisie appoints people 
in developing countries to manage their resources. He calls this particular class the 
“comprador-bourgeoisie”. According to him, this class has a direct relationship with 
the “international bourgeoisie”. He concludes by arguing that the comprador bour-
geoisie receives its instruction from the international bourgeoisie on how to manage 
the economy of developing countries, consistent with Fanon’s (1967) formulation. 
The economic exploitation between First World countries and Third World countries 
is made possible by the distortion of developing countries’ economies to serve the 
interest of developed countries of the North. Again, neo-imperialism undermines in-
dustrial production in developing countries, which are flooded with imports of cheap 
manufactured goods from First World countries and by insisting on the cheap export 
of raw material. Proponents of the dependency theory criticise the architects of the 
modernisation school for misleading developing countries that poverty alleviation can 
be achieved by following capitalist ideology (Baran 1957; Frank 1969; Amin 1989; 
Abercrombie, Hill & Turner 2000; Martinussen 2004; Graat &Venter 2004; Marshall 
& Scott 2005). Warren (1980: 3–7) criticises the dependency school for placing “em-
phasis on external factors” such as imperialism. Internal political factors are also to be 
blamed for underdevelopment in developing countries and they include corruption, 
abuse of state institutions and patronage (Jackson & Jackson 1997; Kleinberg 2007). 
The main shortcoming of the dependency school of thought is the over-emphasis of 
the importance of external forces.
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However, this observation does not mean that foreign capitalists are not also exploiting the 
resources of the developing/African countries. It should be borne in mind that public offi-
cials and the political elite in Third World/African countries are to be singled out for causing 
underdevelopment by stealing public funds meant for development. For instance, it is al-
leged that the Gupta family in South Africa has been appointed as a service provider within 
the state machinery due to its relationship with President Jacob Zuma. This was confirmed 
by some senior politicians in the African National Congress (ANC), namely Mcebisi Jonas 
and Vytjie Mentor who have been critical of the Gupta family by accusing them of “state 
capture” and influencing key government appointments. According to the State of Capture 
Report (Public Protector 2016:4), “the Public Protector received three complaints in con-
nection with the alleged improper and unethical conduct relating to the appointments of 
Cabinet Ministers, Directors and award of state contracts and other benefits to the Gupta 
linked companies”. This is an example of corruption, poor leadership and neo-patrimonial-
ism on the African continent. Added to this, Bayart (2010:1–5) refers to rampant corruption 
in Africa as “politics of the belly”. This implies that both the political and economic elites 
are using social capital to accumulate wealth via unethical practices at the expense of the 
poorest of the poor. Over and above, these are some of the gaps of the dependency theory 
with regard to underdevelopment in Africa. The next section discusses the New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and how it is linked to modernisation.
CHALLENGES FOR THE NEW PARTNERSHIP 
FOR AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT
NEPAD has its roots in the Millennium African Recovery Programme (MAP) and the 
Omega Plan for Africa, which was described by its authors as “an African strategy for glo-
balisation”. The Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme was a pledge 
by African leaders based on a common vision, and a firm and shared conviction that they 
have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually 
and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, and to participate 
actively in the world economy and body politic. It is anchored on the determination of 
Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment 
and exclusion in a globalising world. The poverty and backwardness of Africa stand in 
stark contrast to the prosperity of the developed world. The continued marginalisation of 
Africa from the globalisation process and the social exclusion of the vast majority of its 
peoples constitute a serious threat to global stability (Taylor & Nel 2002).
Even though MAP was promoted as a joint initiative of Algeria, Nigeria and South Africa, 
it was a brainchild of the former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki (Gumede 
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2007). It was adopted by the Heads of State Implementation Committee (HSIC) in Abuja, 
Nigeria in 2001 (Kanbur 2001). NEPAD aims to provide an overarching vision and policy 
framework for accelerating economic co-operation and integration among African coun-
tries. Core issues in the marketing of NEPAD focus on the Partnership as:
●● A “holistic and comprehensive integrated strategic framework for the socio-
economic development of Africa” providing a vision for the continent;
●● An African plan conceived and developed by its leaders, with ownership a primary 
concern.
●● A platform for engaging with the rest of world in a partnership (Kanbur 2001:1).
NEPAD’s four primary objectives are: to eradicate poverty, promote sustainable growth and 
development, integrate Africa in the world economy, and accelerate the empowerment of 
women (Kanbur 2001). It is based on the principles of a commitment to good governance, 
democracy, human rights and conflict resolution; and, the recognition that maintenance 
of these standards is fundamental to the creation of an environment conducive to invest-
ment and long-term economic growth. NEPAD also seeks to attract increased investment, 
capital flows and funding, providing an African-owned framework for development as the 
foundation for partnership at regional and international levels (Bond 2006). The basic idea 
of NEPAD is a coordinated development attempt rather than the haphazard country spe-
cific current economic planning and development which have put Africa in a bind, a kind 
of warp of regression and under-development. A central theme of NEPAD is that Africans 
must take control of their own destiny (Gevisser 2007). In the document, one finds such 
uplifting declarations as “Africans must not be the wards of benevolent guardians, rather 
they must be the architects of the own sustained upliftment” and hope of Africa’s peoples 
for a better life can no longer rest on the magnanimity of others (Kanbur 2001:1). However, 
when it comes to the question of mobilisation of resources for development in the central 
theme also it NEPAD seems to contradict this statement with this assertion.
To achieve the seven per cent per annum growth rate needed to meet the IDGs 
(International Development Goals) – most importantly, to have poverty incidence by 
the year 2015 – Africa needs to fill an annual resource gap of 12 per cent of its GDP, 
or US$ 64 billion (Kanbur 2001). This will require increased domestic savings, as well 
as improvements in the public revenue systems. However, the majority of the needed 
resources will have to be obtained from outside the continent. The NEPAD focus on 
debt reductions and ODA as complementary external resources required in the short 
to medium term, and addresses private capital flows as a longer-term concern (Kanbur 
2001:1). NEPAD has been criticised by African scholars and civil society in Africa as play-
ing into the “Washington Consensus” model of economic development. NEPAD calls 
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on member countries to work with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the African Development Bank and the United Nations (UN) agencies to acceler-
ate the implementation and adoption of the Comprehensive Development Framework, 
the Poverty Reduction Strategic and related approaches (Kanbur 2001).
Akindele et al. (2006:7) also shares the same sentiments that “… the failure of neo-liber-
alism as contained in the World Bank/IMF programmes in Africa and other victim states 
elsewhere painfully brings forth questions relating to the possibility of attaining the lofty 
objectives of NEPAD for sustainable local level governance”. This is because these policies 
have failed severally to lift Africa and other victim regions from the quagmire of poverty 
(Akindele et al. 2006). Thus, it makes it doubtful whether any initiative built on the same 
framework would succeed. Hence, doubt whether the initiative that derives its impetus 
from outside Africa and smacks of falsehood to foist originality on this new-colonial con-
ception. Africa-driven development initiatives were all killed by the same forces that are 
today encouraging the NEPAD scheme (Akindele et al. 2006). According to Akindele et 
al. (2006:7) “... another problem that could pose a challenge to the proper integration of 
African States as well as the successful implementation of NEPAD’s aims and objectives 
is also the exiting conflict between member states which arise as a result of territorial and 
border conflicts most of which dates back to colonial days”. One of the most serious prob-
lems facing Africa in the post-colonial period is the series of political conflicts which have 
plagued the continent since independence. Some of the conflicts have colonial origins as 
are evidenced by the involvement of ex-colonies. Ex-colonies though not directly involved 
in conflict have been implicated of supporting either side of the conflict. These political 
conflicts have contributed largely to Africa’s underdevelopment.
This situation of permanent conflict has turned away African leaders’ attention from de-
velopmental issues. A lot of time and resources have been lost in the process. This level 
of political instability and unpredictability on the continent is also a major cause of low 
investment as foreign and local investors continue to regard Africa as a risk. It is argued 
that the leadership that emerged after independence “was characterised by pretentious, 
megalomaniacal venality” (Ayittey 1992:101). It embraced foreign revolutionary ideas, 
and misperceived the process of development. Democracy, freedom for which African 
leaders fought was sacrificed.
CONCEPTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
Machyo (1996:41) explains how African leaders conceive development: “The growth 
theory of development therefore means to produce more for export”. The fundamental 
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structural are not permitted. The colonially imposed vertical division of labour supported 
by the theory of “imperatives advantages” must be adhered to. In that model, the people 
are treated as a means not as the object and of development. Accordingly, the aim of 
development is not to meet the people’s basic needs: food, clothing, shelter, education, 
health and cultural requirements. These are not primary. The result is that “wealth accumu-
lated by foreign investors is superimposed on the people, it becomes not only superficial, 
but ideologically, technically and culturally oppressive and exploitive” (Machyo 1996:41).
Therefore, development in Africa means service of the African people to serve foreign 
aid, IMF, World Bank and imperialists who are against genuine development in Africa. 
Genuine development means the development of the people with their concern and 
cooperation. The objective of development should not be just to develop a thing but 
people. Genuine development has to recognise that human beings have basic needs: 
food, shelter, clothing, health and education. Therefore, any process that does not lead 
to the fulfillment of these basic needs is a travesty of the idea of development. Western 
development only benefited the West and increased social inequality, thus being ex-
ploitative like its system of capitalistic economy. Industrialisation which is in effect what 
Western development means, does not bring about a greater measure of prosperity, and 
lift poverty well above the breadline, it has not in many other respects led to a better 
quality of life. For example, the movement from rural areas into cities and towns, led 
to family breakdown. Instead of mutual support of rural communities, the new urban 
dwellers live in very competitive and harsher conditions.
Western development has always been prejudiced against rural areas and in favour of 
the towns. The new industries that came with development were concentrated in towns 
and cities, where there were better facilities for production and ready markets for their 
goods. This led to the deterioration of rural life and economic endeavours, and led to 
migration to towns and cities to seek employment; thus, fostering urban-bias. This was 
not only a blow to traditional life but also traditional ways of farming. This Western de-
velopmental prejudice created a situation where the needs of rural areas, for roads, com-
munications, goods and services, agricultural supplies and investments were neglected 
in favour of urban areas. Therefore, urban areas benefitted at the expense of rural areas. 
Development in Africa therefore has not only been unfair but also ineffective. It has 
failed to resolve the African problem of poverty. African leaders on the attainment of 
independence followed with passion and hope wrong Western concepts of develop-
ment which in turn exposed Africa to extreme poverty. This was not because of lack of 
knowledge or alternative forms. Western monopoly of development left Africa an empty 
shell; hence, after three decades of independence Africa is still extremely poor. Since 
independence no African leader has worked outside the influence, direct or indirect, of 
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the advanced capitalist countries like the United States or United Kingdom in its internal 
affairs. Through the so-called foreign aid, IMF and World Bank have always wielded de-
cisive influence on Africa’s economic development. There has never been in Africa the 
indigenous development, that is a development thought and development by Africans 
for Africa. That is the kind of development that will meet their needs and not those of 
foreign investors. Both the United States or the United Kingdom or colonial powers were 
not prepared to see any real development take place in Africa. The reason was summed 
up by Baran (1960:11) in the following statement: “What is decisive is that economic 
development in underdeveloped countries is profoundly inimical to the dominant in-
terests in the advanced capitalist countries supplying many important raw materials to 
the industrialized countries, providing their corporations with vast profits and investment 
outlets; the backward world has always presented the indispensable hinterland of the 
highly developed capitalist West”. Therefore, when the colonial powers in particular sur-
rendered political power to the African elites, they did not want to see any fundamental 
changes in the structures they had built in their colonies and in the dominant relationship 
between the ex-colonies and so-called mother countries.
They did not want to see African leaders tampering with the vertical division of labour 
bequeathed to them by the colonial officials. They wanted to see African ex-colonies 
continuing with their role of producing raw materials and providing a market for the 
manufactured commodities imported from the industrialised capitalist countries. Hence 
one can see that independence did not end the foreign domination and exploitation of 
Africa. Davidson points out that “the point ... to emphasise is that the extraction of wealth 
from an already impoverished Africa was in no way halted by the transfer of power ... a 
transfer of poverty continued as before, even while the means of transfer were modified 
or camouflaged” (Davidson 1992:219). The conditions of the African people who had 
hoped that independence would change their conditions of poverty brought by colo-
nialism are now becoming worse. Under the IMF’s “Structural Adjustment Programme” 
African people have become extremely poor. According to Turok (1987), the IMF pro-
gramme failed in Africa because the policies pursued amounted to a massive betrayal of 
the interests of the people. As a result of this anti-people policies, the African people lost 
confidence in the governments run by African people (Turok 1987:17).
TEETERING ON AFRICA’S 
DEVELOPMENT TRAJECTORIES
It has become evident that Western styles or forms of development prescribed for African 
continent have failed to achieve its objectives. Thus, the present problem of dependency 
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and underdevelopment in Africa will not be solved by current strategies. Western devel-
opmental models were transferred to Africa without taking into consideration local needs 
and priorities. Some African scholars have questioned the suitability and viability of the 
liberal development model for Africa. They have forcefully argued that Africa has to go 
beyond liberal development to African-oriented development which would address not 
only the question of formal equality but that of social justice and equity as well. One of 
the critical problems with current development practice in Africa is the marginalisation of 
the local people in decision-making process by Western developers. Hence, Dei (1998) 
asserts that Northern development experts, researchers, and practitioners for example, 
cannot continue to examine or promote development in the periphery as if they are not 
implicated in the structures of global domination and exploitation of the South. The de-
nial of complicity does not allow these so-called experts to examine the complex and 
sometimes problematic relationship between the researcher and the group with which he 
or she is working.
Abrokwaa (1999:666) offers some strategies for African-oriented development for use 
by African governments and policy makers: “African governments and policy makers 
should employ the African traditional methods of communalism which brings together 
the knowledge, skills, and labour of all community members and involve them in 
decision-making process”. Involvement of members of community in decision-making 
process helps to create democratic participation and give insight into the viability and 
feasibility of the proposed developmental project: In Africa and any other third world 
area the local people are always kept out of decision making process, and forced to ac-
cept whatever is given to them. Communalism as one of the strengths and foundations of 
African societies can become an effective political tool to initiate and implement major 
developmental projects (Abrokwaa 1999).
Development must also be need-oriented, self-reliant, indigenous, and environmen-
tally sound. This strategy would clearly define projects and expect outcomes or results. 
The developmental projects based on regional needs rather than large-scale national 
needs tend to produce good results. In addition, the emphasis must be placed on the 
production of commodities that are more likely to be consumed locally to ensure 
their marketability (Abrokwaa 1999). The strategies adopted must lead to sustainable 
development and focus on building local capacities, so that people can become ini-
tiators and implementers of their own development on their own terms (Abrokwaa 
1999). African leaders are also urged to be committed to the economic upliftment 
of their people instead of exploiting them for individual selfish ends. If the central 
political system, which has the power to endorse all projects, is fully committed to 
the well-being of the people, it is more likely that concrete results would be realised 
Volume 10 number 2 • June 2018 31
from implemented projects because such projects would be adequately financed 
(Abrokwaa 1999).
The final strategy offered by Abrokwaa (1999) is the urgent need to democratise both 
the domestic and the international economic order to allow equal participation in the 
decision making process. Industrialised countries should not trade with African states 
only on the terms laid by them (Abrokwaa 1999). It is evident that Western definitions 
and models of development have failed in Africa. They have impoverished the people of 
Africa and drawn them into insurmountable debts. It is therefore time for Africa to take 
the lead and define her African-centred development. According to Dei (1998:143–144),
“It is development that reflects the lived realities and the goals and aspirations of 
the grassroots of African communities. It is a form of ‘development’ rooted in indig-
enous peoples’ sense of moral and values, and the connections between the social 
and natural worlds. It is a critical perspective on development that argues that local 
communities should own and control the solutions to their own problems. But real 
and effective community control is possible only if the development agenda seeks 
to centre indigenous knowledge systems in the search for solutions to human prob-
lems. This means articulating an alternative conception and praxis of development, 
one that does not reproduce the existing total local dependency on ‘expert advice’. 
Local input must be from the grass roots and should tap the diverse views, opinions, 
and interests manifested in the communities. How we can help to tap such local 
knowledge to assist the development process is our challenge”.
One of the critical problems with current development practices in Africa is the mar-
ginalisation of the local people in the decision-making process by Western developers. 
Hence Dei (1998: 144) asserts:
“Northern development experts, researchers, and practitioners for example, cannot 
continue to examine or promote development in the periphery as if they are not 
implicated in the structures of global domination and exploitation of the South. The 
denial of complicity does not allow these so-called experts to examine the complex 
and sometimes problematic relationship between the development researcher and 
the group with which he or she is working”.
It is not by chance that Africa has remained underdeveloped. Consuming what it does not 
produce and producing what it does not consume, the continent exhibits an imbalanced, 
externally oriented economic structure that can, to a large degree, be attributed to the ne-
glect of the development of its human resources and to its colonial legacy (Adedeji 1993).
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The article explored the factors that present challenges to conception and practice of de-
velopment in Africa, raising concerns with prominent theoretical formulations. It outlined 
the evolution of development thinking relating to Africa as well as the predominance of 
modernisation thinking and Western-driven paradigms. It argues that for African leaders, 
development is conceived as the work of foreign investors developing local people to 
catch up with their type of modernisation. The concepts range from the conception that 
development in Africa is a service of foreign Aid, IMF and World Bank. Even NEPAD’s 
goals locate themselves a broad international development debate, while at the same 
time locating local ownership as an African-driven and African-focused initiative. What 
is clear from the various conceptions is that there is no room for African initiated devel-
opment and African driven. Its prospects of success are based on foreign interventions. 
It fails to accept that foreign aid and intervention has failed in Africa. It is also clear that 
the present problem of dependency and underdevelopment in Africa will not be solved 
by current strategies. However, this article does acknowledge some of the institutional 
factors that have contributed to Africa’s underdevelopment, namely poor leadership and 
corruption in particular neo-patrimonialism.
Among other things, the article proposes that the African political elite/bureaucrats need 
to take some responsibility for Africa’s underdevelopment due to its corrupt activities. 
This implies that not all African problems should be attributed to Western universalism. 
There are other complexities at play, namely elite accumulation (via the state machinery) 
and poor leadership. Clearly, this cannot be blamed on the modernisation theory. It is 
an African problem caused by African people and has a negative spillover effect on 
development. This signifies that underdevelopment is not a simplistic concept. Suffice to 
say, it has complexities at play. Among other things, the article recommends that African 
political leaders and civil servants need to put the interests of the majority of people first, 
before their personal interests in order for development to take place. That is, a process 
of public participation needs to take place before the application of the development 
theory. People from different sectors and backgrounds need to play a meaningful role in 
making a development policy.
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